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CHEVRON AS CONSTRUCTION 
Lawrence B. Solum† & Cass R. Sunstein†† 
In 1984, the Supreme Court declared that courts should 
uphold agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provi-
sions, so long as those interpretations are reasonable.  The 
Chevron framework, as it is called, is now under serious pres-
sure.  Current debates can be both illuminated and softened 
with reference to an old distinction between interpretation on 
the one hand and construction on the other.  In cases of inter-
pretation, judges (or agencies) must ascertain the meaning of 
a statutory term.  In cases of construction, judges (or agencies) 
must develop implementing principles or specify a statutory 
term.  Chevron as construction is supported by powerful argu-
ments; it is consistent with the underlying sources of law, and 
agencies have relevant comparative advantages in developing 
implementing principles.  Chevron as interpretation is more 
controversial.  Those who reject Chevron in the context of inter-
pretation should nonetheless accept it in the context of con-
struction.  The distinction between interpretation and 
construction explains some important cases in the 1940s and 
also in the post-Chevron era. 
I. TWO CHEVRONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1465 
II. AMBIGUITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1472 
III. AN OBJECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1478 
IV. THE QUESTION OF LEGAL AUTHORITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1483 
V. TERRA FIRMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1486 
I 
TWO CHEVRONS 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.1 has a strong claim to being the most important case in all 
of administrative law.  It offers a familiar two-step framework 
for organizing judicial review of agency interpretations of law. 
† Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
†† Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. 
1 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
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In the Court’s own words, “[f]irst, always, is the question 
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to 
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”2  If the in-
tent of Congress is not clear, courts must proceed to Step Two. 
Again in the Court’s words, “if the statute is silent or ambigu-
ous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court 
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible con-
struction of the statute.”3  With Step Two, courts ask whether 
the agency’s interpretation is “permissible” or reasonable, not 
whether it is correct. 
On a standard view, this framework reflects a unitary 
“Chevron Doctrine.”4  It applies to a single activity, called “in-
terpretation,” and it grows out of a single problem, called “am-
biguity.”  In the face of ambiguity, courts show “deference” to 
agency action.  This simple framework captures much of the 
conventional wisdom about Chevron.  If the framework is un-
derstood in this light, the current controversy over Chevron is 
understandable.  Contrary to Marbury v. Madison,5 it seems to 
say that it is emphatically the province of the administrative 
department to say what the law is.6 
2 Id. at 842–43. 
3 Id. at 843. 
4 The literature is vast.  For a highly selective sampling, see generally 
Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1392 (2017); Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: 
How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. 
REV. 779 (2010); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549 
(2009); Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An 
Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255 (1988); Jacob E. Gersen & 
Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676 (2007); Lisa 
Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933 (2017); Michael 
Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (2015); 
Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269 (1988); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial 
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994); 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency 
Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988); Matthew C. 
Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 
(2009); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron 
Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012); Note, “How Clear 
is Clear” in Chevron’s Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1687 (2005). 
5 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
6 See generally Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187 
(2016) (outlining the tension between Chevron deference and the constitutional 
function of an independent judiciary).  We are bracketing the questions raised by 
so-called “Auer deference,” based on Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997), 
which calls for judicial deference to agency interpretations of regulations (as op-
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With this concern in mind, Justice Neil Gorsuch objects 
that Chevron “[t]ransfer[s] the job of saying what the law is from 
the judiciary to the executive.”7  Justice Brett Kavanaugh de-
scribes Chevron as “an atextual invention by courts” and as 
“nothing more than a judicially orchestrated shift of power 
from Congress to the Executive Branch.”8  Justice Clarence 
Thomas argues that Chevron is inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion.9  In his view, the decision “wrests from Courts the ulti-
mate interpretative authority to ‘say what the law is,’” and 
instead “hands it over to the Executive.”10  Justice Anthony 
Kennedy captured a widespread view in his parting shot at 
Chevron.11  He wrote that “reflexive deference” to agency inter-
pretations “is troubling,” and that “when deference is applied to 
other questions of statutory interpretation, such as an agency’s 
interpretation of the statutory provisions that concern the 
scope of its own authority, it is more troubling still.”12  He 
concluded that “it seems necessary and appropriate to recon-
sider, in an appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chev-
ron and how courts have implemented that decision.”13  He 
suggested that the proper rules “should accord with constitu-
tional separation-of-powers principles and the function and 
province of the Judiciary.”14 
These various suggestions make it clear that the Chevron 
doctrine may be ripe for reconsideration.  But what if there are 
actually two quite distinct Chevron doctrines? In one sense, 
this is an odd suggestion, asking us to think about Chevron in 
a new way.  But as we shall show, the idea that there are two 
Chevron doctrines helps makes sense of much of what courts 
have actually been doing with the doctrine, of where the doc-
posed to statutes).  The status of Auer deference was recently considered by the 
Supreme Court, which narrowly reaffirmed that form of deference (while also 
qualifying it). See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019).  In our view, the 
distinction between construction and interpretation may be relevant in that con-
text as well, but it raises separate considerations.  For a recent discussion of “Auer 
deference,” see generally Kristin E. Hickman & Mark R. Thomson, The 
Chevronization of Auer, 103 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 103 (2019). 
7 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gor-
such, J., concurring). 
8 Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
2118, 2150 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)). 
9 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J. concurring) 
(quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177). 
10 Id. 
11 Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–21 (2018) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
12 Id. at 2120. 
13 Id. at 2121. 
14 Id. 
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trine is most secure, and of where the current controversy is 
most understandable. 
Our analysis turns on an old distinction in American legal 
theory between “interpretation,” which calls for discerning the 
meaning15 of a statute, and “construction,” which calls for de-
termining the legal effect of the statute, through implementa-
tion rules, specification, and other devices.16  The modern 
version of the distinction traces its origins to the work of the 
great contracts treatise writer, Arthur Corbin,17 and was rein-
troduced to contemporary legal theory starting in the 1990s by 
15 The word “meaning” is itself ambiguous. See C.K. OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDS, 
THE MEANING OF MEANING: A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF LANGUAGE UPON THOUGHT AND 
OF THE SCIENCE OF SYMBOLISM 186–87 (8th ed. 1946) (exploring different senses of 
“meaning”); Michael L. Geis, On Meaning: The Meaning of Meaning in the Law, 73 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1125, 1125–26 (1995) (observing that the Supreme Court uses the 
words “means” and “meaning” in multiple ways); A.P. Martinich, Four Senses of 
‘Meaning’ in the History of Ideas: Quentin Skinner’s Theory of Historical Interpreta-
tion, 3 J. PHIL. HIST. 225, 226 (2009) (“Equivocating on the word ‘meaning’ is easy 
both because that word has several related senses and because understanding 
the meaning of a text in one of these senses is crucial to understanding its 
meaning in another sense.”).  To be precise, we use the word “meaning” to refer to 
“communicative content,” roughly the linguistic meaning of the statute in context. 
The communicative content of a statutory text can be understood as the set of 
propositions and concepts that are communicated by the statute to the intended 
readers of the text. See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal 
Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 484–507 (2013). 
16 The interpretation-construction distinction goes back at least as far as 
Francis Lieber in 1939. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 43–44, 
111 n.2 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1970).  Unlike the modern 
version of the distinction, Lieber’s version of the distinction does not explicitly 
differentiate communicative content and legal content. See Gregory Klass, Con-
tracts, Constitutions, and Getting the Interpretation-Construction Distinction Right, 
18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2020); Greg Klass, Interpretation and 
Construction 1: Francis Lieber, NEW  PRIV. L. (Nov. 19, 2015), http:// 
blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/19/interpretation-and-construction-1-
francis-lieber-greg-klass/ [https://perma.cc/K52V-B3YJ]; Greg Klass, Interpreta-
tion and Construction 2: Samuel Williston, NEW PRIV. L. (Nov. 23, 2015), https:// 
blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/23/interpretation-and-construction-2-sa-
muel-williston-greg-klass/ [https://perma.cc/3224-W4CD]; Greg Klass, Interpre-
tation and Construction 3: Arthur Linton Corbin, NEW  PRIV. L. (Nov. 25, 2015), 
http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/25/interpretation-and-construc-
tion-3-arthur-linton-corbin-greg-klass/ [https://perma.cc/8ELH-PJHK]; see also 
Ralf Poscher, The Hermeneutic Character of Legal Construction, in LAW’S HERME-
NEUTICS: OTHER INVESTIGATIONS 207 (Simone Glanert & Fabien Girard eds., 2017). 
17 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON 
THE RULES OF  CONTRACT LAW §§ 532–35 (1960 & Supp.1980); see also 4 SAMUEL 
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 600–02 (3d ed. 1961). 
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Keith Whittington18 and others.19  Today, most courts and 
scholars use the two words interchangeably, sometimes refer-
ring to “interpretation” in the older sense, sometimes to “con-
struction,” and sometimes to both.20  We shall argue that an 
understanding of this old distinction casts a new light on the 
debate over judicial review of agency interpretations of law. 
In Chevron itself, the question involved the meaning of a 
single word in the Clean Air Act: “source.”21  That word was 
undefined in the relevant section of the Act.  The Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) argued that a source could include 
an entire plant.22  The Natural Resources Defense Council ar-
gued that a plantwide definition was unlawful and that every 
pollution-emitting device within a plant counted as a source, 
and not the plant itself.23  But no one seriously disputed the 
linguistic meaning of the word “source”: expressed in the vo-
cabulary of the interpretation-construction distinction, there 
was agreement on the correct interpretation of the statutory 
language.24  The real question was not about the linguistic 
meaning of the term; it was about how to implement that 
meaning in the relevant context.  In that sense, Chevron in-
18 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL  CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED  POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 4–15 (1999); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTER-
PRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5–14 (1999), and 
subsequently in the work of Randy Barnett. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism 
for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613–14 & n.9, 644–45 (1999). 
19 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE  LOST  CONSTITUTION: THE  PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 89–130 (2004, rev. ed. 2014) (discussing the interpretation-construction 
distinction); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 65, 65–66 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett, Interpretation].  One of us (So-
lum) has written on the distinction. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Inter-
pretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010) [hereinafter 
Solum, Interpretation-Construction]; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitu-
tional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013) [hereinafter Solum, 
Originalism]. 
20 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), 
is itself a case in point.  Examples are legion. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. 
Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218–23 (2009); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697–703 (1995).  Justice Antonin Scalia and 
Bryan Garner took the position that “interpretation” and “construction” are sy-
nonymous. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL  TEXTS 15–17 (2012).  For a reply, see Solum, supra note 15, at 483–88. 
Nothing important hangs on the use of the words “interpretation” and “construc-
tion” to describe the conceptual difference between the discovery of the meaning 
(or communicative content) of a statute and the determination of the legal effect 
(including implementing rules) given to the statutory text.  We use those words 
because they reflect longstanding usage. 
21 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(5) (2018). 
22 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837, 857. 
23 Id. at 859. 
24 Id. at 860–61. 
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volved a question of statutory construction.  The Court’s holding 
was that given that two different implementing rules were con-
sistent with the meaning of the statutory text, it should defer to 
the choice made by the agency. 
Many cases follow this basic pattern.  Consider, for exam-
ple, the question whether a statutory term “harm,” in the En-
dangered Species Act, includes “significant habitat 
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures 
wildlife.”25  Landowners and others argued that “harm” was 
limited to hunting or killing members of endangered species, 
and that it could not include habitat modification that inciden-
tally or unintentionally harmed them.26  There is a good argu-
ment that in context, the word “harm” was sufficiently open-
textured as to permit either a broad or a narrow construction. 
Both ways of implementing the statute are consistent with the 
meaning of “harm.”  Let us call such cases “Chevron as 
Construction.” 
Chevron as Construction insists on judicial deference to 
agency action in what is sometimes called the “construction 
zone”—the space created when a statute is vague or open-
textured.  When such spaces exist, someone must fill them 
through an implementation rule, which is more specific or pre-
cise than the statute itself.27 Chevron as Construction does not 
involve deference to an agency’s view of the linguistic meaning 
of the statute, and it does not authorize judicial deference to an 
agency construction that is inconsistent with that meaning. 
Thus understood, Chevron as Construction is consistent 
with relevant sources of law,28 and it is supported by powerful 
25 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 690. 
26 Id. at 693. 
27 The phrase “construction zone” expresses the idea that a statute with 
vague, open-textured, or irreducibly ambiguous language creates un-
derdeterminacy with respect to a set of issues and cases.  In the zone of un-
derdeterminacy, statutory construction is required.  By contrast, the phrase 
“interpretation zone” is sometimes used to refer to the set of issues and cases 
where the outcome is determined by the clear meaning of the statutory text. See 
Samuel P. Jordan & Christopher K. Bader, State Power to Define Jurisdiction, 47 
GA. L. REV. 1161, 1213 (2013) (using the phrase “interpretation zone” to refer to 
the set of issues and cases in which adherence to the meaning of a legal text 
would determine legal effect); Solum, Interpretation-Construction, supra note 19, 
at 108 (introducing “construction zone” to designate issues and cases in which 
the meaning of a legal text underdetermines legal effect). 
28 On those sources, above all the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 551–559 (2018). See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613 
(2019).  In Part IV, we turn to the question whether Congress has authorized 
courts to defer to agency decisions in the circumstances of Chevron as Construc-
tion.  On the primacy of congressional instructions, see Antonin Scalia, Judicial 
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516–17. 
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and familiar pragmatic arguments.  The agency may have an 
advantage over courts in terms of technical expertise.  The 
agency is better equipped to choose between alternative imple-
menting rules on policy grounds.  As the Chevron Court itself 
put it: 
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either 
political branch of the Government.  Courts must, in some 
cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the 
basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences.  In contrast, 
an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking 
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, 
properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of 
wise policy to inform its judgments.  While agencies are not 
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and 
it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Gov-
ernment to make such policy choices—resolving the compet-
ing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did 
not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency 
charged with the administration of the statute in light of 
everyday realities.29 
Nor is Chevron as Construction problematic on separation 
of powers grounds.  When agencies engage in statutory con-
struction, they are not impinging on the judicial responsibility 
to interpret any statute.  The courts can interpret the statute 
and determine whether the agency’s implementation rule is 
consistent with the statutory text.  Indeed, Chevron as Con-
struction requires them to do exactly that.  Under Chevron it-
self, courts must decide, on their own, whether the statute is 
ambiguous; they may not defer to the agency’s view on that 
question.  Moreover, the court defers to the agency’s choice 
only so long as it is reasonable.  In our view, Chevron as Con-
struction stands on firm ground.30  And indeed, many deci-
sions that defer to agency “interpretations” of law, both before 
and after Chevron, are best understood as Chevron as 
Construction.31 
From its inception, however, Chevron could also be under-
stood to support what we will call “Chevron as Interpretation.” 
29 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
865–66 (1984). 
30 Again we assume that there is congressional authorization, infra Part IV. 
31 See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Res. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 
45 (2011) (finding that the Treasury Department reasonably construed “full-time 
employee” in 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10)); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 
208, 217–19, 218 n.4 (2009) (finding that the EPA reasonably construed national 
performance standards under the Clean Water Act); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 28. 
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Recall that “interpretation” is the activity that discovers the 
meaning (the linguistic meaning in context) of the statutory 
text.  Under Chevron as Interpretation, deference to agency in-
terpretations of law is required even when interpretation is 
involved.  The trigger is ambiguity.  Given that for many lawyers 
and judges, the standard vocabulary uses the word “interpreta-
tion” to encompass both the discovery of meaning and the crea-
tion of implementation rules (“interpretation” and 
“construction” in the older sense of these terms), it was natural 
for courts to apply Chevron to cases that involved questions 
about the meaning of the statute—and they did.32 
In short: Chevron as Construction is limited to statutory 
“construction zones.” Chevron as Construction allows agencies 
to operate in the construction zone, so long as they are doing so 
reasonably. Chevron as Interpretation applies Chevron to cases 
that required the resolution of a dispute about the meaning of 
statutory language: these cases are in the “interpretation 
zone,” where the meaning of the statute will determine the 
outcome. Chevron as Interpretation allows agencies to resolve 
ambiguities with respect to interpretation, and that is contro-
versial.  Even so, there are plausible reasons for courts to pay 
substantial attention to an agency’s reading of a statute in 
Chevron as Interpretation cases and perhaps to defer to that 
reading.33  But these reasons are different in kind from those 
that apply in Chevron as Construction cases.  Textualists who 
reject the justifications for deference to agency interpretations 




The word “ambiguity” has several different senses (or se-
mantic meanings).34  One sense of “ambiguity” applies when-
ever a statute is unclear for any reason, including vagueness or 
“open texture.”  When a statute is vague, there are borderline 
32 See, e.g., Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986) (finding that 
the FDA reasonably interpreted 21 U.S.C. § 346 even in light of the statute’s 
ambiguity); see also infra pp. 109–11. 
33 For some of those reasons, see Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Ques-
tions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 368–71 (1986); Scalia, supra note 
28, at 514–18. 
34 For relevant discussion, see generally Ward Farnsworth et al., Ambiguity 
About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
257, 260–91 (2010) (empirically examining the distinctions between how judges 
and ordinary English readers define “ambiguity” and interpret ambiguous texts). 
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cases.35  Open texture, a term made famous by H.L.A. Hart 
in The Concept of Law,36 is more complex.37  Open-textured 
language involves concepts that are not precise, leaving cases 
that might or might not be covered by the concept.38 
But there is another sense of ambiguity, a more technical 
sense, that limits ambiguity to cases in which a statutory provi-
sion has more than one possible linguistic meaning.39  In law 
as in life, most ambiguity is resolved by context.  There may be 
two possible readings given the literal meaning of the words, 
but once we examine the context, only one of these readings 
may be correct.  “Bank” can refer to financial institutions or the 
ground that abuts a river, but in a statute, it will almost always 
be clear which of the two senses of the word was intended. 
“Bat” can be an animal or an implement used by hitters in 
baseball, but in a statute, there will almost never be confusion 
about the meaning of that word.  Semantic ambiguity is ubiqui-
tous, but it is generally resolved by context. 
Because Chevron used the word “ambiguity,” it reinforced 
the natural tendency to read its framework as applicable to 
both interpretation and construction—to both the discovery of 
35 For discussion of the philosophical idea of “vagueness,” see Roy Sorensen, 
Vagueness, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA. PHIL. ARCHIVE (Feb. 8, 1997), https:// 
plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/vagueness/ [https://perma.cc/ 
96QH-62NP]; see infra Part II, pp. 109–10. 
36 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127–28 (2d ed. 1994) (“Whichever 
device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for the communication of standards of 
behaviour, these, however smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary 
cases, will, at some point where their application is in question, prove indetermi-
nate; they will have what has been termed an open texture.”). 
37 The phrase “open texture” was devised by Friedrich Waismann to express 
the idea that family-resemblance concepts are underdeterminate.  Friedrich Wais-
mann, Verifiability, in LOGIC AND LANGUAGE, 117–144 (Antony Flew ed., 1951).  The 
idea of family resemblance itself derives from Ludwig Wittgenstein. LUDWIG 
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 67–77, 108 (P.M.S. Hacker & Joa-
chim Schulte eds., G.E.M. Anscombe et al. trans., rev. 4th ed. 2009). 
38 The phrase “open textured” has been used in different ways by different 
legal theorists.  We are using the phrase “open texture” in a stipulated sense that 
includes (but is not necessarily limited to) the following: (1) terms that express 
family resemblance concepts; (2) terms that express multi-criterial concepts 
where the criteria are incommensurable; and (3) terms that express concepts that 
involve multi-dimensional vagueness.  Whatever the ultimate nature of “open tex-
ture,” we will assume that an open-textured provision has a core of settled mean-
ing and penumbral cases. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law 
and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958) (“There must be a core of settled 
meaning, but there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which words 
are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out.”).  On the idea of mul-
ticriterial concepts with incommensurable dimensions, see Hrafn Asgeirsson, On 
the Instrumental Value of Vagueness in the Law, 125 ETHICS 425, 429–31 (2015). 
39 Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in 
Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 11 (2015). 
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meaning and the creation of implementation rules or the effort 
to specify a vague or open-textured language.  And in some 
cases, Chevron has been applied to interpretation (again, the 
discovery of meaning).  For a clear example, consider Young v. 
Community Nutrition Institute.40  The statute at issue there 
stated that the Secretary of Health and Human Services “shall 
promulgate regulations limiting the quantity therein or thereon 
to such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of public 
health.”41  The question was whether the provision required the 
Secretary to set a tolerance level for aflatoxin, a carcinogen, as 
it would if the phrase “as he finds necessary” modified the 
phrase “to such extent,” or instead gave the Secretary the dis-
cretion not to act at all, as it would if the phrase “as he finds 
necessary” modified the phrase “shall promulgate regulations.” 
Thus, Young v. Community Nutrition Institute involved what is 
called “syntactic ambiguity”: the resolution of the ambiguity 
required interpretation (what did the provision mean?) and not 
construction (how should it be implemented?). 
Justice John Paul Stevens, author of Chevron, thought 
that the case was exceptionally easy.  As he put it, the “antece-
dent of the qualifying language is quite clearly the phrase ‘limit-
ing the quantity therein or thereon,’ which immediately 
precedes it, rather than the word ‘shall,’ which appears eight 
words before it.”42  As he saw it, the alternative interpretation, 
“by skipping over the words ‘limiting the quantity therein or 
thereon,’ renders them superfluous and of no operative force or 
effect.”43  Justice Stevens believed that the statute’s meaning 
was clear (under Chevron Step One) and therefore that defer-
ence was not required.44  (In our terms, he might have been 
read to say that Young was a case of interpretation, not 
construction.) 
But the Court in Young disagreed.  In its words: “As ene-
mies of the dangling participle well know, the English language 
does not always force a writer to specify which of two possible 
objects is the one to which a modifying phrase relates.”45  In the 
Court’s view, the dense sentence could be read either way; “to 
such extent as he finds necessary” could well qualify “shall 
promulgate regulations.”46  In the face of an ambiguous statu-
40 Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 986–87, 987 n.3 (1986). 
41 21 U.S.C. § 346 (2018). 
42 Young, 476 U.S. at 985 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
43 Id. at 986. 
44 Id. at 986–88. 
45 Id. at 980–81 (majority opinion). 
46 Id. 
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tory provision, the agency would prevail under Chevron.  There 
are many cases in this vein.47  A statutory term is ambiguous; 
reasonable people can read it differently.  The agency prevails 
for that reason. 
This is Chevron as Interpretation: deference to an agency in 
a case in which the question concerns the meaning of statutory 
language. Young v. Community Nutrition Institute moved be-
yond Chevron as Construction by deferring to an agency’s in-
terpretation of language that was ambiguous in the narrow 
sense of “ambiguity” that is distinct from open texture or 
vagueness.  Such deference is different in kind from what oc-
curred in Chevron itself—that is, deference to the agency’s deci-
sion about how to implement a statute within the construction 
zone created by vague or open-textured language. 
Justice Stevens’ essential argument does not provide all of 
the picture, but it helps account for the distinction between 
many cases in which agencies prevail and many cases in which 
they do not.  Much of the time, agencies are essentially specify-
ing vague statutory terms.  When they are operating in the 
construction zone, their choices are generally upheld, and 
courts are notably deferential.  Courts find no Step One viola-
tion, and under Step Two, agency choices are usually deemed 
reasonable.48  But in other cases, the real question is how to 
handle an ambiguity.  These cases, typically resolved under 
Step One, often produce losses, and courts are notably less 
deferential.49  In a nutshell: Step One losses, for agencies, typi-
cally involve interpretation rather than construction.  As a prom-
inent example, consider Massachusetts v. EPA,50 which raised 
the question whether the EPA could define the statutory term 
47 See, e.g., Am. Water Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1270–71 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (upholding the Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation of the 
term “feasible” under the Safe Drinking Water Act); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 
Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 219–20 (2009) (upholding the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s interpretation of the phrase “best technology available” under the Clean 
Water Act). 
48 See, e.g., Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. at 217–18 (upholding the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s interpretation of the term “best technology available” to in-
clude a cost-benefit analysis as reasonable); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697–98 (1995) (upholding the Secretary of 
the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act’s term “harm” to in-
clude habitat destruction as reasonable).  Agencies do of course lose, even if they 
are in the construction zone, if their interpretations are deemed unreasonable. 
An illuminating example is Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
49 See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 
225–26 (1994) (holding that the Federal Communications Commission’s interpre-
tation of the term “modify” was not owed deference because the term in its statu-
tory context was not ambiguous). 
50 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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“air pollutant” so as not to include greenhouse gases.  The 
Court ruled that it could not because the term had a single 
meaning, taken in its context.51 
Consider in this light the dispute about the level of ambigu-
ity that is sufficient to trigger Chevron deference.  Should a 
court defer to an agency if it thinks that the agency is forty-five 
percent likely to be right?  Thirty percent?  Twenty percent?52 
When an ambiguity is involved, it seems extreme to say that the 
agency will prevail even if the court has a very firm conviction 
that it is wrong.  Actual practice53 fits with the view that courts 
ought not to accept agency interpretations of ambiguities 
merely because there is some question about meaning.54 
On any view, Chevron as Construction should be un-
problematic, but Chevron as Interpretation can be ques-
tioned.55  From the standpoint of “textualism” (the theory of 
statutory interpretation that holds that courts should be 
bound by the plain meaning of the statutory text, taken in 
context), the interpretive version of Chevron seems problem-
atic.56  Why should agencies be allowed to sort out ambigui-
ties?  Why should courts defer to agency interpretations? 
Young did not seem to present a question about policy or about 
implementing rules; it presented a question about meaning.  At 
the very least, the question whether courts should defer to 
agency interpretations raises distinctive considerations.  In 
short, there are two Chevron doctrines, and they rest on quite 
different premises: the two Chevrons do not stand or fall 
together. 
In an instructive discussion, Justice Kavanaugh implicitly 
distinguishes between construction and interpretation.57  In-
deed, he seems to argue for recasting Chevron in terms that 
closely correspond to those urged here.  Justice Kavanaugh 
contends that when Congress has used some vague or open-
51 Id. at 500. 
52 See Kavanaugh, supra note 8, at 2150–51. 
53 See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 303 (2014) (“Agen-
cies empowered to resolve statutory ambiguities must operate within the bounds 
of reasonable interpretation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); MCI 
Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 226–27 (holding that an agency’s interpretation of 
the term “modify” was not owed deference solely because one dictionary gave the 
word a more expansive definition than is generally accepted). 
54 See Kavanaugh, supra note 8, at 2150–51. 
55 See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in 
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 499 (1989); Abner J. Mikva, How 
Should the Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1986). 
56 We are bracketing the question whether Congress has directed courts to 
defer to agency interpretations. See discussion infra Part IV. 
57 Kavanaugh, supra note 8, at 2121–22. 
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textured term, like “reasonable” or “feasible,” it makes sense for 
judges to defer to agency interpretations.58  He is far more 
skeptical of the idea of deference in cases in which Congress 
has used some specific term.59  In essence, Justice Kavanaugh 
can be seen to be making a distinction between construction 
and interpretation, and arguing that Chevron should be applied 
to the former and not to the latter.60 
We do not mean to say that insofar as he rejects Chevron as 
applied to specific terms, Justice Kavanaugh’s conclusion is 
necessarily correct.  Those who reject his conclusion might 
urge that even in the face of ambiguity—when interpretation of 
specific terms is involved—it is appropriate to allow agencies, 
with their expertise and accountability, to make the choice.61 
On one view, resolution of genuine ambiguities calls for some 
kind of policy choice, or even if it does not, the resolution is 
best made by those with political accountability and technical 
expertise.62  In some cases, textualism might turn out to pro-
duce uncertainty: even if context suggests that one meaning is 
more likely than another, reasonable doubts may remain.  And 
perhaps agencies should be allowed to sort out uncertainty if 
there is room for reasonable disagreement.  In any case, textu-
alism is not the only theory of statutory interpretation; other 
views emphasize the objective purpose or function of statutes. 
Our goal here is not to evaluate Justice Kavanaugh’s criti-
cism of Chevron as it is now understood, but to say that his 
central argument can be accepted while also approving of 
Chevron deference both on the facts of Chevron itself and, more 
generally, in the large category of cases that involve Chevron as 
Construction.  To sharpen the point: it is one thing to say that 
agencies should be allowed to adopt constructions that specify 
or implement the meaning of terms like “source” and “harm,” 
assuming these have not been defined in a way that resolves 
the question of construction.  It is another thing to say that 
agencies should be allowed to decide what words are modified 
by the phrase “to such extent as he finds necessary.”  Textual-
ists can embrace deference with respect to the agency crafting 
58 Id. at 2153–54. 
59 Id. 
60 A similar point can be made about the controversial ruling in Auer v. 
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), though we do not explore that point here. 
61 See Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1626–29. 
62 For a useful discussion of the nature of purposivism or functionalism as a 
theory of statutory interpretation, see Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional 
Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 92–93.  Herz 
distinguishes “purposivism” from “intentionalism.” See id. at 93. 
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of implementation rules, while rejecting deference to agency 
interpretations that resolve semantic or syntactic ambiguities. 
In other words, textualists can embrace Chevron as Construc-
tion, even if they reject Chevron as Interpretation. 
III 
AN OBJECTION 
We are keenly aware of a possible objection to the distinc-
tion we are drawing between interpretation and construction, 
at least for purposes of analyzing Chevron.  Courts today only 
rarely make the distinction in an explicit way,63 and until re-
cently it has been largely lost in contemporary public law.  As 
Professor Michael Herz has observed, “[a]lmost without excep-
tion, writing about statutory interpretation uses ‘interpreta-
tion’ and ‘construction’ as synonyms.”64 
In administrative law, reviving the distinction between in-
terpretation and construction might not be so controversial if 
the distinction were always easy to apply.  But at least some-
times it is not.  In practice, answers to the question whether an 
agency or a court is involved in interpretation or instead con-
struction may not have a clear answer, and lawyers and judges 
63 Very recently, some courts have noted the distinction. See, e.g., Wayne 
Land & Mineral Grp. LLC v. Del. River Basin Comm’n., 894 F.3d 509, 528 n.13 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (“By ‘interpretation of language’ we determine what ideas that language 
induces in other persons.  By ‘construction of the contract,’ . . . we determine its 
legal operation—its effect upon the action of courts and administrative officials.”); 
Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch., 41 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1275 n.86 (D.N.M. 2014) 
(questioning “whether only the semantic meaning of ‘causes’ is fixed . . . based 
upon the term’s original public meaning, or whether the legal doctrines of ‘causa-
tion’ are also fixed”); Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Voeltz, 431 N.W.2d 783, 
786 (1988) (“Because this case was tried to the court, the distinction between 
interpretation and construction becomes important in relation to our scope of 
review.  When, as here, extrinsic evidence is offered for the interpretation of policy 
words, the court’s interpretation if supported by substantial evidence is binding 
on us.”); Wischmeier Farms, Inc. v. Wischmeier, 883 N.W.2d 538, *3 (Iowa Ct. 
App. 2016) (unpublished table decision) (“Interpretation is the process of deter-
mining the meaning of the words in the contract, while construction is the process 
of deciding their legal effect.”); Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. v. Barrick Goldstrike 
Mines, Inc., 345 P.3d 1040, 1041 (Nev. 2015) (arguing that the meanings of the 
Constitution’s words remain constant, but their application may vary depending 
on time and place).  Other courts continue to resist the distinction. See Absher v. 
AutoZone, Inc., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 817, 821 n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Although 
there may be a theoretical distinction between ‘interpretation’ and ‘construction,’ 
we make no such distinction.” (citations omitted)). 
64 Herz, supra note 4, at 1891–92; see also Evan J. Criddle, Response, The 
Constitution of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 325, 341 
(2016) (“[S]tatutory construction constitutes statutory meaning through an act of 
juris-generative judgment that draws on normative considerations.”). 
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could have reasonable disagreements about the proper charac-
terization of an agency action. 
In short, one might object to our use of the interpretation-
construction distinction on the ground that it is an unfamiliar 
idea that is sometimes difficult to apply in practice.  We begin 
our reply to this objection by emphasizing that if the distinction 
is not familiar, it once was,65 and it is more familiar now than it 
was a decade or two ago.66  In the context of administrative law, 
Professor Gillian Metzger has deployed the distinction in her 
argument for “administrative constitutionalism” as a manifes-
tation of constitutional construction.67  Both Professor Michael 
Herz and Professor Evan Criddle have noted the possible signif-
icance of the interpretation-construction distinction for Chev-
ron deference.68  Evan Bernick’s recent article, Envisioning 
Administrative Procedure Act Originalism, discusses the signifi-
cance of the interpretation-construction distinction for an 
originalist understanding of the Administrative Procedure 
Act.69  More broadly, the distinction between interpretation 
and construction has come to be recognized in many contexts, 
65 See supra text accompanying notes 6–7. 
66 See Amy Barrett, The Interpretation/Construction Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law: Annual Meeting of the AALS Section on Constitutional Law, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 1, 1 (2010); Harold Anthony Lloyd, Speaker Meaning and the Interpreta-
tion and Construction of Executive Orders, 8 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 319, 323 
(2018); Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The 
Case of Executive Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2018); Brian Taylor Goldman, 
Note, The Classical Avoidance Canon as a Principle of Good-Faith Construction, 43 
J. LEGIS. 170, 172–75 (2017); supra text accompanying notes 8–9. 
67 Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 
1912–14 (2013). 
68 See Criddle, supra note 64; Herz, supra note 4, at 1871.  Professor Jeffrey 
Pojanowski also notes the potential significance of the distinction for Chevron. 
See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 
852, 887 n.185 (2020). 
69 Evan D. Bernick, Envisioning Administrative Procedure Act Originalism, 70 
ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 835 (2018). 
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including constitutional law,70 contract law,71 criminal law,72 
patent law,73 and the law of trusts and wills.74 
But we acknowledge that on some theories of interpreta-
tion, the distinction is contestable.  Take, for example, Ronald 
Dworkin’s view, which sees interpretation as an effort to make 
the best constructive sense out of the relevant legal materials 
(including statutory text).75  To simplify a complex story, Dwor-
kin’s approach requires judges (1) to respect the constraints of 
“fit” (meaning fidelity to the existing materials) and (2) within 
those constraints, to decide what best “justifies” the existing 
materials, by making the best constructive sense of them.  In 
constitutional law, for example, the meaning of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, as applied to (say) bans on same-sex marriage, 
would turn on what ruling would make that Clause the best 
that it can be.  We could say the same thing about “source” and 
“to such extent as he finds necessary.”  If we embrace Dwor-
kin’s view, Chevron would, on plausible assumptions, rest on 
new and firmer grounds.  Aren’t agencies in a better position 
than courts to make the best constructive sense out of statu-
tory provisions?  But on other also plausible assumptions, 
Dworkin’s view casts Chevron in a much worse light.  Shouldn’t 
independent courts attempt that task? 
But put the questions of comparative competence, and of 
trust and distrust, to one side.  It should be clear that on Dwor-
kin’s view, the distinction between interpretation and con-
struction is blurred: this blurring is reflected in Dworkin’s label 
70 Barnett, Interpretation, supra note 19; Solum, Originalism, supra note 19, 
at 453;. 
71 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Hermeneutics and Contract Default Rules: An 
Essay on Lieber and Corbin, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2225, 2225-26 (1995); E. Allan 
Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 940 (1967). 
72 Paul R. Piaskoski, The Federal Bank Robbery Act: Why the Current Split 
Involving the Use of Force Requirement for Attempted Bank Robbery Is Really an 
Exception, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 675, 685 (2019). 
73 Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Dis-
tinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530, 536 (2013). See also Camilla Hrdy & 
Ben V. Picozzi, Claim Construction or Statutory Construction?: A Response to Chi-
ang & Solum, 124 YALE L.J. F. 208, 208–11 (2014). 
74 Richard F. Storrow, Judicial Discretion and the Disappearing Distinction 
Between Will Interpretation and Construction, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65, 65–66 
(2005); Jarell A. Dillman, Note, Where There’s a Will There’s a Way: An Examina-
tion of In Re Estate of Kesling and the South Dakota Supreme Court’s Application of 
the Plain Meaning Rule, 60 S.D. L. REV. 121, 133 (2015). 
75 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 52–53 (1986).  For discussion of the complex 
and uncertain relationship between Dworkin’s views and the interpretation-con-
struction distinction, see Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. 
L. REV. 551, 568–69 (2010). 
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for his theory, “constructive interpretation.”76  For Dworkin, 
interpretation has a constructive dimension, and necessarily 
so.77  For those who embrace purposive approaches to inter-
pretation, or follow the Legal Process approach, the same might 
76 Ronald Dworkin, Bork’s Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 676 (1990) 
(reviewing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW (1990)). 
77 Because Dworkin does not explicitly address the interpretation-construc-
tion distinction, his position has to be teased out from his development of the 
theory of constructive interpretation.  Some version of the conceptual content of 
the interpretation-construction distinction might be implicit in Dworkin’s notion 
of “semantic availability,” introduced in the following passage: 
[Lawyers] must decide, for example, what division of political au-
thority among different branches of government and civil society is 
best, all things considered.  That question in turn forces upon 
American lawyers, at least, further and more general questions of 
democratic theory; they must assume or decide, for instance, draw-
ing on theory or instinct, how far unelected judges should assume 
an authority to decide for themselves which of the semantically 
available interpretations of a controversial statute would produce 
the best law. 
RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 133 (2011).  As one of the present au-
thors (Solum) has argued, the notion of semantic availability, when combined 
with the idea that “constructive interpretations” must fit and justify the legal 
materials, seems to imply something that is very much like the conceptual con-
tent of the interpretation-construction distinction.  Dworkin’s implicit reliance on 
the distinction is especially clear when he relies on a two-step model of construc-
tive interpretation: 
We can now see that the first step involves interpretation; after 
Hercules identifies the set of authoritative legal texts, he then ascer-
tains their linguistic meaning or semantic content.  The linguistic 
meaning of the texts in turn determines what Dworkin calls “seman-
tic availability.”  The second step involves construction—determina-
tion of the content of legal doctrine from among the range of 
possibilities that are semantically available.  In easy cases, the 
range of semantically available alternatives is narrow.  Once we 
have discovered the linguistic meaning of the relevant legal texts, 
the relevant content of legal doctrine is clear, and construction (the 
translation of semantic content into legal content) is easy.  In hard 
cases, the range of semantically available alternatives un-
derdetermines the set of possible legal doctrines, and determination 
of the legal effect of the text requires construction that goes beyond 
easy translation of semantic content into legal content.  This addi-
tional work at the stage of construction is what makes these cases 
“hard.”  Hard cases are located in what I call “the construction 
zone.” 
Solum, supra note 75, at 569 (footnotes omitted).  We take no position on the 
question whether Dworkin himself is implicitly committed to the conceptual con-
tent of the interpretation-construction distinction, but we observe that his resort 
to semantic availability illustrates the powerful pull of the idea that discerning the 
linguistic meaning of legal contexts can be distinguished from determining their 
legal effect.  The conceptual content of the interpretation-construction distinction 
is independent of the use of the words “interpretation” and “construction” to mark 
the difference between meaning and legal effect. 
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also be true.78  The distinction between interpretation and con-
struction is intelligible only on certain assumptions about the 
nature of interpretation.  In other words, the interpretation-
construction distinction is contestable; the merits of the dis-
tinction are linked to deep and persistent theoretical debates 
about the nature of legal interpretation in general and statu-
tory interpretation in particular. 
Nonetheless, we insist that the distinction should not be 
elusive or even obscure to lawyers and judges.  Without a clear 
statutory definition of “source,” a plantwide approach does not 
depart from the standard meaning of that term.  Without a 
clear statutory definition of “harm,” significant habitat modifi-
cation, actually killing or injuring wildlife, may or may not 
count as such.  But whether we side with the majority or the 
dissent in Young, there was no construction zone.  As we have 
seen, the only question was whether the placement of “to such 
extent as he finds necessary” produced ambiguity.  Some of the 
prominent Supreme Court decisions that apply Chevron defer-
ence plainly involved construction,79 and some of the most 
prominent decisions that refuse to defer to agency views plainly 
involved interpretation.80  It is not so hard to say which is 
which.  Our confidence in the ability of judges and lawyers to 
understand and apply the interpretation-construction distinc-
tion is bolstered by the prominent role that it played in legal 
theory and practice during the first half of the twentieth 
century. 
In other words, we believe that the interpretation-construc-
tion distinction is intelligible, even if it is also contestable.  Crit-
ics of Chevron who insist that “interpretation” is the proper 
function of judges and embrace a textualist approach may 
nonetheless embrace Chevron as Construction.  Deference to 
agencies in the construction zone is entirely consistent with the 
preservation of judicial authority over statutory interpretation. 
Purposivists and others like Dworkin who may reject the inter-
78 See John F. Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 457, 458–59 (2014). 
79 Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009); Babbitt v. 
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 US 687, 687–88 (1995).  To be 
sure, it would be possible to argue, in these cases, that the agency’s decision was 
an erroneous interpretation.  In some cases, the real debate, within the Court, is 
whether what is involved is a reasonable construction or instead an erroneous 
interpretation. 
80 See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 218–19 
(1994). 
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pretation-construction distinction may support further exten-
sions of the Chevron doctrine for other reasons. 
In these circumstances, we suggest that there may be com-
mon ground on Chevron as Construction.  Judges might be 
able to reach an incompletely theorized agreement81 that defer-
ence is appropriate in cases in which an agency acts to clarify 
vague or open-textured language—despite disagreement at the 
more fundamental theoretical level about what theory of statu-
tory interpretation is true or best.  Recall that the distinction 
between Chevron as Interpretation and Chevron as Construc-
tion helps to explain a number of the decided cases.  To be 
sure, it is more usual to say that when agencies lose, it is 
because statutory terms are unambiguous at Step One.  In at 
least some such cases, however, there is at least some kind of 
ambiguity—but the Court insists on resolving it.82 
Because of the fundamental distinction between Chevron 
as Interpretation and Chevron as Construction, there is good 
reason for the Supreme Court to adopt a cautious approach if it 
should decide to reexamine the Chevron doctrine.  If the Court 
were to undertake such a reexamination in a Chevron-as-Inter-
pretation case, it should be careful to distinguish that context 
from the superficially similar Chevron-as-Construction cate-
gory.  In this area, the Court would be wise to adopt a minimal-
ist approach, proceeding one step at a time and avoiding a 
sweeping approach that conflates interpretation and construc-
tion.83  Whatever the Court ultimately decides about the viabil-
ity of Chevron as Interpretation, it is clear that the viability of 
this aspect of Chevron turns on concerns that are substantially 
different from those that apply to the less controversial Chevron 
as Construction line of cases. 
IV 
THE QUESTION OF LEGAL AUTHORITY 
Thus far, we have argued that Chevron as Construction is 
easy to justify and that the argument on behalf of Chevron as 
Interpretation is both more challenging and different.  These 
81 Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
1733, 1735–36 (1995). 
82 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 498–99 (2007); MCI Telecomms. 
Corp., 512 U.S. at 218–19. 
83 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON 
THE SUPREME COURT (2001); see also Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, 
and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951 
(2005) (arguing that Sunstein’s theory of judicial minimalism may not be descrip-
tively accurate or normatively convincing). 
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arguments operate at the level of principle.  But we have 
delayed answering a question that is both natural and essen-
tial to ask: what source of law justifies judicial deference to 
agency interpretations of law, and does it allow for a distinction 
between interpretation and construction? 
Section 706 of the APA says that courts “shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statu-
tory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of 
the terms of an agency action.”84  It also says that courts shall 
“hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and con-
clusions found to be . . . not in accordance with law”85 or “in 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or 
short of statutory right.”86  These provisions might be read to 
make a simple declaration: decisions about the meaning of 
statutes are for courts, not agencies, and the interpretation-
construction distinction is beside the point.87 
This is not a wholly implausible reading of the text of sec-
tion 706.88  Professor Thomas Merrill writes that the text “sug-
gests that Congress contemplated courts would always apply 
independent judgment on questions of law.”89  Professor John 
Duffy agrees and adds, “[t]he legislative history of the APA 
leaves no doubt that Congress thought the meaning of this 
84 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). 
85 Id. § 706(2)(A). 
86 Id. § 706(2)(C). 
87 Even from a purely textualist perspective, there is a case to be made that 
Section 706 is consistent with Chevron as Construction.  The injunctions to “in-
terpret constitutional and statutory provisions” and decide “all relevant questions 
of law” is ambiguous for at least two reasons.  5 U.S.C. § 706.  First, the word 
“interpretation,” when used without reference to the interpretation-construction 
distinction, is ambiguous, sometimes referring to the combined activity of inter-
pretation and construction but sometimes to construction or interpretation alone. 
Second, the injunction to decide all relevant questions of law assumes but does 
not specify some standard of relevance.  In light of the legislative history, dis-
cussed briefly below, see supra text accompanying notes 84–92, and more fully by 
Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1644–52, a case could be made that these ambiguities 
should be resolved in favor of a reading that requires courts to determine the 
linguistic meaning of the statutory text but allows for agency construction when 
statutory language is vague, open-textured, or otherwise incomplete.  Although 
textualists eschew the use of legislative history as a source of purposes or inten-
tions that determine statutory constructions independently, textualists can and 
should embrace legislative history in the contextual disambiguation of language 
that is vague or open textured.  Even Justice Scalia embraced this role for legisla-
tive history. See Lawrence B. Solum, Federalist Society Panelist, Text Over Intent 
and the Demise of Legislative History, 43 U. DAYTON L. REV. 103, 114 (2018). 
88 See the important discussion in Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial 
Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908 (2017), which reaches this 
conclusion without engaging the construction-interpretation distinction. 
89 See Merrill, supra note 4, at 995. 
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provision plain.”90  Professor Jerry Mashaw sees things the 
same way.91  But this reading is not inevitable.  Read in its 
context, the text section 706 is far from clear.  The answer to 
the “relevant question of law” may depend on what the agency 
has said.  With respect to judicial review of agency interpreta-
tions of law, Section 706 could easily be read as a restatement 
of existing law, which allowed courts to defer to such interpre-
tations; a great deal of contextual evidence in the 1940s sup-
ports exactly that reading.92 
This is not the place for a full discussion, but we note that 
the Senate Judiciary Committee print announces, “[a] restate-
ment of the scope of review . . . is obviously necessary lest the 
proposed statute be taken as limiting or unduly expanding 
judicial review.”93  It adds that the goal of the section is “merely 
to restate the several categories of questions of law subject to 
judicial review.”  The important 1945 letter of the Attorney 
General, written to both houses of Congress shortly before en-
actment of the APA, had this to say about section 706: “This 
declares the existing law concerning the scope of judicial 
review.”94 
And what was that existing law?  In the key cases in which 
the Court gave deference to agency judgments about law, the 
construction zone was involved.  In Gray v. Powell,95 decided in 
1941, the Court was asked to review a determination by the 
Director of the Bituminous Coal Division that a railroad com-
pany was not the “producer” of certain coal that it consumed. 
The Court said that Congress had “delegate[d] th[e] function” of 
interpreting the statutory term “to those whose experience in a 
particular field gave promise of a better informed, more equita-
ble” judgment, and that “this delegation will be respected and 
the administrative conclusion left untouched.”96  These prag-
matic observations were made in a case in which the agency 
90 See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. 
L. REV. 113, 193 (1998). 
91 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Rethinking Judicial Review of Administrative Action: 
A Nineteenth Century Perspective, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2243 (2011). 
92 See Sunstein, supra note 2861, at 1664. 
93 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., REPORT ON S. 7: A BILL TO 
IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BY PRESCRIBING FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH 
CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1944–46, at 
11, 39 (1946) [hereinafter APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (emphasis added). 
94 S. Rep. No. 79-752 (1945), as reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 93, at 187, 230; see also APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 93, at 279, 414 
(emphasis added). 
95 Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411–12 (1941). 
96 Id. at 412. 
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was specifying the meaning of “producer,” an open-textured 
term, and in which the linguistic meaning of that term would 
support different constructions. 
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications,97 decided in 1944, the 
Court was asked to decide on the meaning of the word “em-
ployee” under the National Labor Relations Act, as applied to 
“newsboys.”  It said that the agency’s “[e]veryday experience in 
the administration of the statute gives it familiarity” with the 
underlying problem and concluded that the agency’s interpre-
tation “is to be accepted if it has ‘warrant in the record’ and a 
reasonable basis in law.”98  Here as well, the linguistic meaning 
of the word “employee” did not either require or forbid the 
agency’s view.  As for the term “source,” so for the terms “em-
ployee” and “producers”: the agency was engaged in construc-
tion, and the Court deferred to its decisions.  There are many 
cases in this vein. 
No large body of law is easily fit within a simple framework, 
but we think that it is plausible to say that in cases in which 
courts deferred to agency decisions in the pre-APA period, con-
struction was frequently involved.  We have noted that some-
thing similar can be said about the period since the APA was 
enacted, emphatically including many decisions that apply the 
Chevron framework.99  When agencies lose under Step One, it 
is because they did not interpret the statute correctly.100  When 
agencies win under Step One, it is often because they are in the 
construction zone.101  It would be excessive to say that the 
interpretation-construction distinction organizes all of the 
cases, or explains what is “really” going on in them.  But it is 
not excessive to say that in many of the most important cases, 




Our main suggestion is that Chevron is on firm ground 
insofar as it requires courts to defer to agency constructions of 
97 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944). 
98 Id. at 131. 
99 See Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 558 (2012); Mayo Found. 
for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 45 (2011); Household 
Credit Servs. Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238 (2004). 
100 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007); MCI Telecomms. 
Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 218–19 (1994). 
101 Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009); Babbitt v. 
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 687–88 (1995). 
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law.  On that understanding of Chevron, its framework is com-
patible with relevant sources of law, and agencies are in a 
better position than courts to devise implementing rules and to 
specify the meaning of open-textured terms.  Reasonable peo-
ple can and do disagree about whether Chevron is on firm 
ground insofar as it requires courts to defer to agency interpre-
tations of law.  The case against Chevron as Interpretation rests 
on the plausible view that interpretation—resolving questions 
about the meaning of a statutory text—is the responsibility of 
the courts.102  But that does not entail the quite distinct con-
clusion that agencies may not devise implementation rules for 
vague, open-textured, or incomplete statutory language.  Tex-
tualists can oppose Chevron as Interpretation and embrace 
Chevron as Construction. 
The distinction between Chevron as Interpretation and 
Chevron as Construction accounts for widespread intuitions 
and much (though not all) of actual practice.  Whatever Chev-
ron’s ultimate fate, we should be able to agree on one proposi-
tion: it makes sense to apply its framework to agency decisions 
in the construction zone.  In other words, Chevron itself, or 
Chevron as Construction, should be uncontroversial. 
102 One of us offers a general account of Chevron, with qualified approval of 
Chevron as Interpretation, in Sunstein, supra note 61, at 1672–73. 
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